Report on service from 112 Squadron - Feliks Gazda

The fighter school in Khartoum provided an opportunity for an excellent preparation for combat. In spite of this, the majority of our pilots left it inadequately prepared. Pilots were rarely posted individually to the training course the way we were. More often, entire squadrons would come and, as whole organised units, they passed exactly the entire syllabus, as their commander would take care of it. Individual pilots, on the other hand, tried to leave the school as quickly as possible, without sufficiently mastering their training. This is how it was with our pilots. They left for the front line having logged 14-20 hours of formation flying training (this was what most attention was paid to). The school authorities took into account the desire to go to the front line quickly and a pilot with sufficient number of hours, if not the quality of tasks, could leave. Training in the OTU consisted of ground and flying training.

Ground training (equipment operation and tactics) gave pilots the possibility of acquiring maximum knowledge in a very accessible format. The British and our Polish authorities ensured the acquisition and possibility of this training. We had all the instructional facilities. All the instructors did their best for us to the point of exaggeration. The Polish authorities assigned a translator for us and all manuals, tactics, were translated to Polish. Pilots mastered the ground training sufficiently.

Flying training. The flying training period was not specified, a pilot could train for 3 to 7 weeks, depending on how quickly he wished to go to the front line. The training programme consisted of 25 tasks, including night flying.

Our pilots were not trained sufficiently. The reason was as follows: pilots had between 100 and 150 flying hours of ferrying on fighter aircraft, resulting in the school authorities viewing them as old fighter pilots, apparently not realising that except for good landings, the men had absolutely no idea of fighter training. Having flown many hours (as ferry pilots), but an insufficient time as fighters, they were supposed to go to the front line: they graduated. The pilots themselves began saying that the school had given them nothing. It had not, because they wanted to leave quickly. As an example of the tasks, the comparison of my flying to theirs can be used. I had been a fighter for 8 years. They were, mostly, just civil flying club pilots. I flew approx. 25 sorties at the school, including 10 firings. Others flew 14–20, including 2–3 firings. Our authorities learned about this and also gave the opportunity for additional training. The pilots, except for me, were all sent to a gunnery school at Bibeis. I am not able to write much about that school. I know that the school had been recently established, was not completely organised, they flew between 2–6 sorties and returned to the front line. The will to leave the school quickly as well as not paying attention to my advice (I could only provide advice since I had no other authority), was fatal. In my opinion, there were about 4 pilots who were very good in ferrying, the rest were barely able to stay airborne. As an example, I can quote a conversation after a combat. When I asked a pilot what he did when he was attacked by the enemy, he answered ‘I pushed my stick and escaped towards the ground’. Or a pilot leaves his plane after a patrol and says: ‘Today’s sortie went very well, because the ball (gyro) was always in the middle’.

We arrived at the front line on 10 February 1942, to join 112 Squadron. Here, we were introduced to a new type of aircraft, the ‘Kitty’. Again, the pilots did not listen to my advice; for them only the British were their superiors. Without any real training, after just two experience sorties, we flew a combat operation. During the first (experience) sortie, F/O Matusiak was killed while dogfighting at 100 meters in an aircraft type unknown to him.

The following was the method of introducing us to operations: after flying 2 sorties on the new type of aircraft, the commander asked if we felt well. Naturally, everybody replied that more than well. (We should have, in my opinion, flown 5–10 sorties.) We were posted in the list of sequence and formation position for an operation. That was all the briefing there was, keep in formation. The operation of the flight [squadron] was organised in such a way that for half a day, half the pilots sat in the aircraft, and the next half of the day, the other half of the pilots. If the numbers were low, the pilots sat all day long. I heard no briefing beyond the assigning of positions in formation, before or after a flight, except if there was an encounter, then it was necessary to make a report for the intelligence officer.

Information about the enemy and equipment was limited to posting enemy aircraft silhouettes in the mess. I do not recall us being informed about where the front line or enemy air bases were. Aircraft were not allocated personally and I heard complaints from our pilots regarding this. The method of flying operations was as follows: the Squadron Commander (who had about 20 kills) had a couple of section leaders. The rest of the pilots covered the rear as extras.

This is what the basic formation looked like.

1st flight

1T 2T 3T

4T 5T 6T

nos. 4, 5, 6 fresh pilots

2nd flight

1T 2T 3T

4T 5T 6T

During an attack by the enemy, who generally flew higher (the Kitty is a low altitude aeroplane) the pilots made a turn left or right. Those attacked were left on the battlefield, and the rest, not seeing the enemy, returned to base. I do not recall the whole squadron returning to base. Return to base was done singly, in pairs or fives. The reasons were unknown because, I suspect, nobody asked about them.

There were quite many encounters, about 3 a week. Losses almost in each encounter, except for encounters with Italians. The morale mood was, for a while, poor. Pilots were killed by the enemy or by falling into a flat spin (that is how three died during my stay with the squadron). On one occasion, 3 priests of various faiths came. They sat with us, heard confessions, and held services. At the same time, the quality of our catering improved, hence a joint mess with the NCOs. This was during a slightly depressing period. This method of religious consolation did not, I suspect, lift the mood. For me, personally, it had a negative impact.

The missions flown were as follows:

1. interception

2. direct cover

3. bombing

4. sweeps.

The first type of activity, scrambling at a signal, where pilots were in their aircraft, was aimed at engaging the enemy who had crossed our lines. This method was not always effective, with a distance of about 70 miles from the front line. So, after a certain time, the squadron was moved about 40 miles from the front line. The enemy harassed our squadron by single fighter aeroplanes bombing, sometimes quite accurately, due to the impossibility for complete or even just sufficient camouflage in the desert. We were forced to move the squadron rearwards. The solution to this matter was as follows: the squadron took off to an advanced airfield for the day and returned to the principal one in the evening. It was a type of ambushing by high numbers. I think this was a better method of operation, although it was changed soon.

Cover. This type of activity did not differ from our cover, with the exception that cover here was not only layered above, but also for both sides of the bomber formation. Bombing of a target sought out by the pilot or pre-assigned. Bombing of aircraft on an airfield from low altitude gives excellent results. I saw one such fighter damage about 6 aeroplanes in one sortie.

Sweeps are flown by a couple of squadrons, and in the way where a part of the force flies over the enemy (for example, an airfield), and then the majority of the force engages after the enemy has been overflown and provoked. The objective and method of this type of operation does not differ from our own: destruction of the enemy encountered at various altitudes.

General observations. In spite of inadequate flying training from a fighter pilot perspective, the pilots flew a lot, especially the NCOs, in difficult desert conditions, putting in enormous effort. Staff turnover is very high in these conditions. This is shown by the fact that during my time with the squadron from 10.2.1941 [sic!] to 5.5.42, the entire lot of squadron pilots changed, with the exception of 3 pilots and the 8 of us. The British personnel policy is very good in my opinion, since they allow each pilot to transfer to a non-operational unit after 3 months, so the mood among pilots is not one of hopelessly sitting in the squadron until they die. Among our pilots, out of 8, 3 were shot down. Seeing this, and seeing friends who left the squadron, and then some language problems led to an application for transfer to Polish squadrons. The wear of equipment, operational staff, and auxiliary staff in the desert is disproportionally big compared to that in other conditions. Under these special conditions, in my opinion, the staff should be rotated like the British do.

A squadron of so varied nationality, composition, does not give excellent results. In spite of friendly closeness, groups always form. About 3 Englishmen, 3 Canadians, 8 Australians, and 8 Poles.

Radio communications often fail completely or by creating linguistic misunderstandings, especially in important situations, when it is most needed.

Encounters and tactics of combat with the enemy. Encounters, as I have noted previously, were quite frequent. In principle the enemy flew higher than us and attacked from above. Our way of action was defensive in such cases, we evaded by turning right or left and attacked the enemy after his attack. We had numerical superiority, even though at take-off about 15% of our machines did not start for various reasons. The Germans flew together with the Italians very often. The Macchi 202 aircraft always proved inferior in combat with our pilots. During one combat about 10 of the 2002s [sic!] were downed. Me 109s appeared in 2s, 4s, 6s. The Germans flew in small groups, attacking even a large group of us, striking once and escaping, not engaging in combat. Once or 2–3 times a month, about 30 or 40 Messerschmitts appeared making a demonstration (sweep). Presumably, they brought air force from Sicily for a couple of days, and then again small groups like skirmishers attacked us and escaped. A few words about the airfields. The airfields were good (landing grounds), entire squadrons could always take off simultaneously. After taking off, we gained height in the desert, where there was not much surveillance. It was difficult to camouflage the airfield. Camouflaging was limited to installing the squadron in a vast space, 2 kilometres. Sometimes, they camouflaged with German aeroplanes or friendly unserviceable ones, parking the aircraft in various ways. I did not see any German bombers bombing in daytime, probably due to our superiority. However, I did see a couple of times that they bombed us using single, Me. 109 fighters. The enemy flew very high, and then at a certain time, with convenient angle of light, flew down low over the airfield, dropping bombs. There were bombings at night by individual aircraft, but inaccurate. In the desert it is more difficult to locate the target, despite a clear night.

The night fighter force has a relatively pleasant job, because of clear nights and frequent enemy flights.